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dollar appreciation that then helped to
widen the current account deficit. At that
time, the current account deficit adjusted
to the growing financial inflows. 
We can often get a basic idea about
which set of transactions dominates the
adjustment process by observing the
relationship between changes in the cur-
rent account deficit and movements in
the dollar. As noted above, when the
impetus starts with a financial inflow, the
dollar appreciates and the current
account deficit widens. But, when a
widening current account deficit—
responding, for example, to domestic
aggregate demand growth—leads the
process, the dollar moves in the opposite
direction. If we buy more goods and ser-
vices from abroad than we sell, we add
dollars to the foreign exchange market
and cause the dollar to depreciate. This
in turn makes our financial instruments
more attractive to foreign savers. 
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The United States has run a current
account deficit for the past 20 years,
and, as a consequence, foreigners
now hold unprecedented financial
claims on the United States.  At some
point, foreigners will become reluc-
tant to hold these claims and will set
into motion a series of corrective eco-
nomic adjustments.  This Economic
Commentary describes the interaction
between our current account deficits
and the broader economy and
explains the problem that continued
deficits pose.  
T he U.S. current account deficit
reached a record $664.8 billion in the
second quarter, renewing fears of a
flight from the dollar with wrenching
consequences for U.S. economic pros-
perity. There is, of course, nothing
intrinsically wrong with a country run-
ning a current account deficit, and as the
global economy becomes more closely
integrated, we should see countries sus-
taining large, persistent current account
deficits and surpluses. But the United
States has run a nearly unbroken string
of current account deficits for 20 years,
and, as a by-product, the world now
holds an unprecedented amount of
financial claims against the United
States. Many fear that foreigners are
becoming saturated with these claims
and worry that with U.S. current account
deficits likely to continue, a correction is
surely in the offing. 
This Economic Commentary offers a
hitchhiker’s guide to the U.S. current
account problem for those who want to
follow along, but are not inclined to take
the wheel. I show how foreigners
finance our propensity to import, stop-
ping long enough to make the connec-
tion between our budget and current
account deficits. I explain why growing
current account deficits and expanding
inflows of foreign savings are not indefi-
nitely sustainable, and why big deficits
imply big corrections. Throughout the
trip, however, I emphasize that we sim-
ply have no basis for determining when,
how fast, or how jarring any adjustment
might be. Those who claim a definitive
word on that topic may just be spinning
their wheels. 
■ Basic Relationships
In running a current account deficit, the
United States uses more of the world’s
output than it produces, and we import
more goods than we export (figure 1). In
exchange for the extra imports, we offer
the rest of the world financial claims
against our future output. We will gladly
pay tomorrow for output today. 
These financial claims consist of stocks,
bonds, Treasury issues, bank accounts,
and other types of securities. Private
individuals and organizations hold most
of these claims, but foreign govern-
ments, their central banks, and interna-
tional organizations often take up a 
good portion. 
The issuance of financial claims creates
a net flow of foreign savings into the
United States that, absent measurement
error, exactly equals our current account
deficit. Even though millions of people
make independent decisions about trade
and unconnected choices about which
financial instruments to buy, if their
actions do not match up, a whole host of
economic parameters—exchange rates,
interest rates, prices, etc.—will adjust to
pull them into alignment. This balancing
act occurs, as Adam Smith observed, as
if directed by an invisible hand. 
I have discussed the basic correspon-
dence between current account balances
and net financial flows as if the latter
responds to the former, but this need not
be the case. Changes emanating from
either set of transactions will produce
responses in the other. In the late 1990s,
for example, net financial inflows grew
in response to attractive financial oppor-
tunities in the United States, causing a■ The Twin Deficit Problem
Extending these fundamental interna-
tional relationships just a bit more
establishes a potentially important link
between the U.S. current account and
budget deficits. When the government
budget deficit rises, as it recently has, it
often raises alarm, even though budget
deficits have usually remained a minor
sidebar to the U.S. current account
problem. The alarm is not wholly mis-
placed; under some circumstances a
growing budget deficit could increase
the current account deficit. 
When foreigners hold net financial
claims on the United States, their sav-
ings do not sit idle in U.S. bank
accounts, corporate coffers, or the Trea-
sury. Americans tap these funds to
finance investments and consumption.
Consequently, a country that runs a cur-
rent account deficit and experiences an
inflow of foreign savings will find that
its domestic investment exceeds its
domestic savings by exactly that
amount, assuming no measurement
error (figure 2). Net domestic invest-
ment in the United States currently
amounts to approximately 8 percent of
GDP, while net domestic savings equals
roughly 2 percent of GDP. The 6 per-
cent difference equals the ratio of the
current account deficit (and net foreign
financial inflows) to GDP. 
Since federal, state, and local govern-
ments finance their budget shortfalls by
issuing debt instruments to savers, bud-
get deficits—all else constant—reduce
the amount of private savings available
to finance private investment in the
United States and put upward pressure
on interest rates. Attracted by the
prospect of higher yields, foreigners
channel their savings into the United
States and fill the growing wedge
between domestic investment and sav-
ings. In the process, aggregate demand
also expands, causing the current
account deficit to widen. Many econo-
mists refer to this connection as the
“twin deficit problem”—a wider govern-
ment budget deficit leads to a wider cur-
rent account deficit, all else constant.  
But all else rarely stays constant, and
there is the rub. While this connection is
logically straightforward, economists
have not mustered much empirical 
support for it, because widening U.S.
budget deficits set off all sorts of eco-
nomic reactions. If, for example, budget
deficits result in higher interest rates, 
private investment might fall and private
savings might rise with constant or even
smaller current account deficits.
Between 1992 and 2000, for example,
the total federal, state, and local budget
balance shifted from a deficit of $297
billion to a surplus of $239 billion, but
the current account deficit widened by
over $365 billion, instead of falling as
the twin-deficit story predicts. 
One should not take comfort in the fact
that the connection between the budget
and current account deficits is empiri-
cally tenuous. Governmental spending,
taxing, or borrowing policies that raise
interest rates, lower domestic invest-
ment, and slow economic growth could
impede our ability to sustain our current
account deficits.
■ Sustainability 
The U.S. current account deficit has
grown over the past 20 years, irrespec-
tive of the government’s budget posi-
tion, and, in the process, foreign savers
have accumulated a growing stock of
financial claims on the United States.
Since 1986 foreigners have held more
financial claims on the United States
than U.S. residents have held against
them, and in 2003, the latest available
data, foreigners held net claims against
the United States exceeding $2.4 tril-
lion. Given current projections for the
current account deficit, this number
could easily top $4.0 trillion by the end
of 2006.
When foreigners hold more claims
against the United States than we hold
against them, our country’s net interna-
tional investment position turns negative
(figure 3). Because these financial
instruments ultimately represent claims
to our future output, economists typi-
cally gauge our net international invest-
ment position as a percentage of our
GDP. What matters is not the net dollar
amount of outstanding financial claims
on the United States, but their size rela-
tive to our ability to service them—their
ratio to GDP. This ratio, which has
expanded quite sharply since 2000,
reached a record 22 percent of GDP in
2003 and will probably approach 35
percent of GDP by 2006. 
FIGURE 1 CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE
NOTE:  Data plotted for 2005 and 2006 are based on the author’s estimate.
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Net savingsWhether this percentage is particularly
big or small is unclear. More important
than the ratio is the disconcerting direc-
tion and speed in which it is headed.
Since our negative net international
investment position represents a foreign
claim to our future output, the ratio can-
not fall (become a bigger negative num-
ber) indefinitely as a share of GDP. As
foreign portfolios become heavy with
dollar-denominated financial instru-
ments, global investors will eventually
grow uncertain about our ability to
smoothly service these claims and
increasingly reluctant to hold them in
their portfolios without compensation
for the growing risks of doing so. When
this starts to unfold, the dollar will
depreciate, and U.S. interest rates will
rise. These adjustments—dollar depre-
ciation and higher interest rates—will
increase the prospective return on dollar-
denominated claims, compensate for the
risks, and discourage further foreign
diversification out of them. 
When observers ask if the current
account deficit is sustainable, they are
really questioning when and how fast
these adjustments might take place,
implying concern for their potential
economic consequences. Higher inter-
est rates will narrow the gap between
domestic investment and savings by
reducing the former and encouraging
the latter. Domestic consumption then
should slow. At the same time, the dol-
lar’s depreciation will narrow the U.S.
current account deficit by raising the
dollar price of imports and lowering the
foreign-currency price of exports. This
adjustment should encourage foreigners
to buy more of our goods. To com-
pletely stop net foreign claims against
the United States from expanding 
relative to GDP, however, the current
account deficit must pretty much disap-
pear. So the bigger our current account
deficit grows, the larger the potential
interest and exchange rate adjustment
could be. A large, very rapid dollar
depreciation and interest rate rise might
put the economy into a bit of a tail pin,
with less investment, lower consump-
tion, and rising import prices. A smooth,
prolonged adjustment, on the other
hand, might be barely perceptible. 
Unfortunately, economists have no 
scientific basis with which to determine
when and how fast this adjustment
might be. While we are sure that our
negative net international investment
position cannot expand indefinitely rela-
tive to GDP, we simply do not know if
the trigger point for rapid diversification
out of dollar assets is 30 percent, 50 per-
cent, or even 100 percent of GDP. Cases
of large developed countries in similar
circumstances are few and not necessar-
ily comparable to the United States.
Moreover, the U.S. dollar’s fairly unique
position as the world’s key international
currency limits the prospects of for-
eigner diversification. 
Although the dollar has depreciated sub-
stantially since it peaked in February
2002, portfolio diversification out of 
dollar-denominated assets has not been 
the main driving force (figure 4). As 
suggested above, portfolio diversifica-
tion will prompt a narrowing of the 
current account deficit; instead, our
deficit has widened. The present 
pattern—dollar depreciation and a
widening current account deficit—
suggests that the U.S. balance of pay-
ments is primarily adjusting to faster
aggregate demand growth in the United
States than abroad. Until foreign eco-
nomic growth substantially exceeds 
U.S. economic growth, which seems
doubtful in the next year or so, the cur-
rent account deficit is destined to expand
as Americans continue to buy more from
abroad than the rest of the world buys
here. Foreign savings will flow in, and
U.S. investment will exceed domestic
savings. 
■ Are the Risks Rising?
Growing global interdependence, which
ultimately allows us to consume more
than we produce and to invest more than
we save, also increases our vulnerability
to world events. What matters to foreign
investors is a credible promise to repay
their claims. This promise implies that at
some point in the future Americans must
either increase their production, slow
their consumption, or both to meet their
growing obligations. Anything that
reduces the long-term growth prospects
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in the United States—inappropriate fiscal
and monetary policies, prolonged war,
adverse economic shocks—increases the
difficulty of financing our outstanding
claims. Events that do so raise the chances
that foreigners will shy away from dollar
assets at lower ratios of those outstanding
claims to GDP, say, 35 percent of GDP,
than at higher ratios, say, 50 percent or
100 percent. This prospect will become
even more important as growth abroad
strengthens. 
During most of the 1990s, rapid growth
in domestic savings and investment
accompanied the expanding U.S. current
account deficit (figure 2). The corre-
sponding inflow of foreign savings
helped to finance a U.S. investment
boom that contributed to productivity
and increased our country’s long-term
growth potential. In a sense then, the
inflow in foreign savings fostered condi-
tions that could eventually ease the
future burden associated with servicing
them, and foreigners were not sensitive
to the sharp rise in the net international
investment position relative to GDP.
With a return to these circumstances,
which may now be tentatively taking
hold, a continued rise in net foreign
claims, even relative to GDP, might not
rattle investors. A decline in investment
and a further decline in savings, how-
ever, could have the opposite effect. 
Uncertainty is not much of a palliative,
but uncertainty pervades this issue.
Economists are pretty sure about where
we are heading, but we simply do not
know when the journey might com-
mence, how quickly we might get there,
or how rough the road might be. 
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